
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This bibliography, produced in monthly installments from an online database, provides selective annotations of serials and monographs on the army of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (North Korea). Entries are arranged alphabetically by author in three sections: modernization of the North Korean army, strategies and tactics used by the North Korean army during the Korean War (1950-53), and strategies and tactics used by the North Korean army since the war.			
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PREFACE

This bibliography provides selective annotations of open-source material and covers the following topics:

- modernization of the North Korean Army,
- North Korean Army strategy and tactics in the Korean War, and
- North Korean Army strategy and tactics since the Korean War.

The bibliography incorporates serials and monographs received in the previous month and is part of a continuing series on the above subjects.

Entries are arranged alphabetically by author or title. Library of Congress call numbers, where appropriate, are included to facilitate the recovery of works cited.

GLOSSARY

CPLA Chinese People's Liberation Army

CFC Combined Forces Command (US and ROK)

DPRK Democratic People's Republic of Korea (North Korea)

NKA North Korean Army

NKAF North Korean Air Force

NKN North Korean Navy

KPA Korean People's Army (Comprises NKA, NKAF,

and NKN)

KWP Korean Workers' Party

ROK Republic of Korea (South Korea)

ROKA Republic of Korea Army

ROKAF Republic of Korea Air Force

ROKN Republic of Korea Navy 1. MODERNIZATION OF THE NORTH KOREAN MILITARY

Ensor, Paul. "Facing Up to Moscow." <u>Far Eastern Economic Review</u> (Hong Kong), vol. 132, no. 16, 17 April 1986, pp. 17-18. HC411.F18

The US and ROK positions on the issues of the North Korean and Soviet threats to South Korea are reviewed in this article. US Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger, during a visit to South Korea for the annual US-ROK security consultative meeting, is said to have expressed concern over the growing Soviet influence in North Korea. The US and ROK are said to agree that recent Soviet shipments of MiG-23/FLOGGER fighter aircraft, surface-to-surface missiles (SSM), and surface-to-air missiles (SAM) are developments of mutual concern to both countries. The author reports that the US plans to deploy more Stinger and Redeye missiles to South Korea, and to assist the ROK in improving early warning systems, in order to counter the increasing Soviet involvement in North Korea.

"Military Balance." Military Technology (Bonn), vol. 9, no. 13, December 1985, pp. 269, 317. Not in LC.

This issue of Military Technology is a reprint of the 1985-1986 issue of The Military Balance published by the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London. Source includes estimates of the number of personnel and the various types of weapons in the NKA, NKN, and NKAF. Additionally, table one entitled "Nuclear-Capable Delivery Vehicles: Worldwide," mentions that North Korea has approximately 54 FROG-5/-7 launchers. However, it is also noted that North Korea is not known to possess any nuclear warheads.

US Defense Security Assistance Agency. <u>Congressional</u>

<u>Presentation on Proposed Security Assistance Programs for</u>

<u>FY1986</u>. Washington DC: US Defense Security Assistance
Agency, 1986. 431 pp. UA12.U516

The report states that the ROK will require US military support through the foreign military sales program for the foreseeable future because of the size and offensive capabilities of the KPA. The NKA and NKN are said to have

significantly more personnel and weaponry than the ROKA and ROKN. However, the ROKAF is believed to have a qualitative advantage over the NKAF. North Korea's high level of defense spending—about 20 percent of GNP—is considered to be a major reason for that country's economic problems. In contrast, South Korea spends about 6 percent of its GNP on defense.

2. NORTH KOREAN ARMY STRATEGY AND TACTICS IN THE KOREAN WAR

Endicott, Stephen L. "Plausible Denial: The Korean War, 1952-1953." Modern China (Los Angeles), vol. 5, no. 1, January 1979, pp. 79-104. DS701.M575

In 1952 and 1953, the Chinese and North Koreans claimed the US was using biological warfare (BW) in their countries. This article evaluates the credibility of these claims, and assesses their effect on international public opinion during the last year of the Korean War. The author believes that a June 1952 report, published by an international commission which had carried out an on-the-spot investigation in China and North Korea to determine if the US had used BW, damaged US prestige by supporting the Communist allegations. Additionally, Endicott discusses the public statements of a former US Air Force Colonel who says that he participated in a BW program during the Korean War. The author concludes that the US probably did use BW in the War, but believes that public opinion in Western countries allied with the US remained supportive of the US war effort. The Communist propaganda campaign on BW is said to have had little effect on the unity of the Western alliance.

Halliday, Jan. "The Korean War: Some Notes on Evidence and Solidarity." <u>Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars</u> (Charlemont, Ma.), vol. 11, no. 3, July-September 1979, pp. 2-18. DS1.B84

Halliday challenges existing evidence on the events leading up to the beginning of the Korean War on 25 June 1950. To highlight two of his concerns, he cites a 30 July 1950 New York Times article based on a briefing provided to reporters by a representative of General Douglas MacArthur. First, Halliday questions whether the KPA was fully mobilized on 25 June 1950. Second, he suggests it was unusual that US intelligence on North Korean military activities near the DMZ in June 1950 provided no warning an invasion was imminent. It is his opinion that US Embassy officials in Seoul at the time of the attack never adequately explained why friendly intelligence agents proved so ineffective in providing this much needed information. While the author does not say that US and ROK government officials covered up the facts about ROKA incursions into North Korea in June 1950,

he believes it is plausible that such actions contributed to the timing of the North Korean attack. Pyongyang may also have counted on South Korean support for the invasion because of the low level of support which existed for ROK President Syngman Rhee. Halliday frequently writes on Korea and often supports North Korean historical and political positions. He says that additional research is needed to obtain a better understanding of the 25 June invasion and other events of the Korean War.

Okonogi, Masao. "The Shifting Strategic Value of Korea, 1942-1950." Korean Studies (Seoul), vol. 3, 1979, pp. 49-80. DS901.K854

This article analyzes the US and Soviet positions on Korea before the NKA invasion of South Korea in June 1950. The author concludes that the Soviets were aware of the strategic importance the Korean peninsula would have as the demarcation point of US and Soviet spheres of influence in Asia and the Pacific in the post-World War II era. He suggests that the buildup of the NKA between 1947 and 1950, along with Soviet and Chinese support for the buildup, should have been taken more seriously by policymakers in Washington. Okonogi believes that in 1950 the Soviet Union was interested in expanding its defensive perimeter to include all Korea so as to fill the power vacuum left by the 1947 withdrawal of US Forces. In his opinion, Soviet leaders never intended a subsequent invasion of Japan by Soviet Forces.

Pettigrew, Thomas H., Jr. <u>The Kunu-ri (Kumori) Incident</u>. New York: Vantage Press, 1963. 55 pp. DS921.6.P4

The author was assigned to a US Army unit which was deployed near North Korea's border with China in November 1950. He claims that many GIs needlessly lost their lives when the CPLA attacked Kunu-ri on 30 November because of the ineffective leadership provided by his battalion commander. The book provides one soldier's impression of what happened in Kunu-ri and during the US Army's retreat from North Korea in December 1950. There is very little

discussion of CPLA strategy and tactics employed during this major offensive.

Wilkinson, Allen Byron. <u>Up Front Korea</u>. New York: Vantage Press, 1968, 440 pp. DS921.6.W48

Chapters eight, nine and ten of this book describe battles fought at the Naktong River, Kunu-ri, and Chipyong-ri, respectively. Eyewitness accounts of the tactics employed by the NKA and CPLA during the Korean War are provided in these and other chapters. The author was a US Army corporal who served with the 23d regiment of the Second Infantry Division from August 1950 to July 1951.

3. NORTH KOREAN ARMY STRATEGY AND TACTICS SINCE THE KOREAN WAR

"Buildup Continues in Far East and Vietnam." <u>Asian Aviation</u> (Singapore), vol. 6, no. 5, May 1986, pp. 39-41. Not in LC.

North Korea is said to be facilitating the growth of Soviet military power in Asia and the Pacific by allowing the Soviet Air Force to fly reconnaissance and simulated combat missions over North Korean airspace using Tu-16/BADGER and Tu-95/BEAR aircraft. The article is based on the 1986 edition of Soviet Military Power published by the US Department of Defense.

"Full Text of MCUI Minister Lee's Address." Korea Herald (Seoul), 28 June 1986, p. 3.

South Korean Minister of Culture and Information Lee Won-hong told a predominantly American audience on 25 June that there is a very real possibility that North Korea will attempt an invasion of South Korea in the next two to three years. Lee repeated the official ROK Government position saying that because North Korean leaders see the military balance on the peninsula shifting to the South's favor, they may decide to strike before Pyongyang forfeits its military advantage to Seoul. Lee made these statements during a speech delivered to the American Chamber of Commerce in Korea. The Minister suggested anti-Americanism is not a "widespread public sentiment" in Korea and noted that South Korean radical groups are Marxist in orientation. Lee argued that democratization of South Korea must be achieved in a way that does not threaten the security, prosperity, and stability of the nation.

"Incidental Intelligence." <u>Pacific Defence Reporter</u> (Kunyung, Australia), vol. 13, no. 1, July 1986, p 24. Not in LC.

NKA Chief of Staff O Kuk-yol is reported to have said that North Korea must achieve national reunification by any means possible in order to establish a united and Communist nation. This implies that North Korea is willing to use armed force to achieve reunification. O reportedly made this statement on 24 April during

ceremonies commemorating the 54th anniversary of the KPA. Other high ranking KWP, government and military officials attended the rally.

"Pyongyang Organizes Quick Assault Unit." <u>Korea Newsreview</u> (Seoul), vol. 15, no. 13, 29 March 1986, p. 11. DS901.K715

Article reports that the 85 Hughes 500MD helicopters surreptitiously imported by North Korea have been painted to look like South Korean helicopters. Personnel belonging to North Korean special forces units are said to be undergoing training at Pakchon, 10 kilometers north of Pyongyang, in how to infiltrate South Korea using these helicopters. The Japanese newspaper <u>Sankei Shimbun</u> is cited as the primary source.

"Pyongyang-Moscow Military Honeymoon Disturbs China." <u>Korea</u>
<u>Herald</u> (Seoul), 27 July 1986, p. 3.

This article claims that China is growing increasingly wary of Soviet-North Korean military relations in the wake of two recent naval exchanges and North Korean support for Soviet assistance to Vietnam. An unnamed Western military source in Beijing is said to have speculated that the 4-9 July visit to the North Korean port of Wonsan by a Soviet Navy flotilla, and the 25-29 July visit to the Soviet port of Vladivostok by a NKN flotilla, represent more than symbolic examples of friendship. The Western source believes that the Soviet Union and North Korea are preparing to conduct joint naval maneuvers, and, further, that the two countries will use the Wonsan-Vladivostok connection as an important link in a new bilateral security arrangement. The Japanese news agency Kyodo is said to have reported that the Chinese are upset over the expansion of Soviet-North Korean military cooperation to include naval activities. Kyodo is also said to have reported that China has formally asked North Korea to stop allowing Soviet aircraft to land in or even fly over the latter's airspace en route to Vietnam. Both of the above-mentioned sources are said to agree that should the

Soviet Navy be allowed access to the North Korean port of Nampo, China would be forced to take some defensive countermeasures.

"Soviet Navy Ready to help North Korea in Emergency: Sidorov."

<u>Korea Herald</u> (Seoul), 10 July 1986, p. 1.

Article reports that the Commander of the Soviet Pacific Fleet expressed a willingness to conduct joint naval exercises with the NKN. Admiral Vladimir Sidorov is said to have made the statement during an official visit to North Korea to commemorate the 25th anniversary of the Soviet-Korean Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance. Sidorov led a 3-ship contingent of the Soviet Pacific Fleet on a visit to the North Korean port of Wonsan. The article does not discuss the activities of the Soviet delegation during its 4-8 July stay in North Korea.